Page 12 - Sept 2015 Volume 19 Number 9

At about 1,200 fpm, the VVI needle finally reversed and began to climb. This time I centered the cyclic while the VVI was still in the bottom half of the indicator and tried not to change any other controls. The altimeter was still decreasing but its rate was slowing. The VVI needle continued to rise, although it slowed as it passed level flight. The altimeter bottomed out at about 150 feet and held steady. A quick glance at the drunkenly- pitching compass told me nothing; for all I knew, I was flying deeper and deeper into the belly of the Blob. I held my breath and concentrated on the gauges that could provide useful information to keep me alive for another thirty seconds.I was still waiting for the instruments to settle down when I popped out the side of the fog. BAM! Just like that. One second I was fighting for my life, deep in the bowels of the Blob, the next I was bathed in the morning sun with all my life’s opportunities beforeme. Thank you, God. I breathed deeply and laughed out loud.I landed on the closest platform and called for the workboat. Just as I finished strapping down the old Bell the Blob arrived. By the time the MV Dora arrived to take me back to base, even my feet had begun to look fuzzy in the thick fog.My entire excursion into instrument conditions had lasted perhaps two minutes, though it seems a lifetime when I examine it. I was thankful the fog grounded me until the following day. It gave me time to analyze my actions and reflect on what the experience had taught me.Assessing RiskThe lessons, of course, are obvious. But it’s oversimplification merely to remind others of the hazards of VFR-into-IMC flight. That is the consequence of flawed decision-making, not the cause.My decision to continue in the face of obviously-deteriorating conditions is inexplicable. I simply made up my mind that I could do it, then focused on accomplishing what I’d decided. When a successful outcome became less assured, I threw out all the stops in an attempt to complete the approach. Even as I was entering the fog, I was still determined to complete it, rather than to consider an alternative course.In my subsequent 24 years as an Air Force fighter pilot, I benefited greatly from a concept we called CRA, for Combat Risk Assessment. Simply stated, CR A requires the decision-maker to weigh the likely cost of a course of action against the likely benefit. Factors to consider include the probability of success, the value of the best-case success, the cost of the worst-case failure, which conditions affecting the outcome are known and controllable, and alternative courses of action. I approach all decisions (OK, most decisions) from a CRA framework.B/E Aerospace, Inc. Half Page4/C Ad10 • TWIN & TURBINESEPTEMBER 2015