Page 40 - Volume 15 Number 10

have a tendency to revert to tactical thinking in an attempt to complete the task at hand. This phenomenon, referred to as continuation bias, is exacerbated in the single-pilot environment as there’s no oversight from a second pilot. In a crew environment the monitoring pilot would be tasked with identifying safety concerns and be empowered with a veto if the situation deteriorated.Single-pilot operators should identify benchmarks that if not met (e.g. stabilized approach, landing in the touchdown zone, etc.) should result in a new line of thinking. SingleWith sufficient fuel to proceed to the alternate or hold, a pilot will likely engage in optimum decision-making when faced with convective activity in the terminal area. The best option will be selected from the available choices.During dynamic, uncertain, or time-critical events a pilot will revert to recognition-primed decision-making; selecting the first available workable option even though it may not be the best. In this situation the right engine fire will necessitate an immediate response.38 • TWIN & TURBINEpilots should also be alert for confirmation bias, or the tendency to unintentionally manipulate information to support what the pilot intends to do. In essence, the pilot hears what he wants to hear and sees what he wants to see instead of objectively analyzing incoming data. In some cases the situation may be changing so rapidly that the time available for processing is insufficient, leading to assumptions rather than evaluation. One way to combat informational bias is to deliberately look for reasons to discontinue the current action.Overestimating one’s abilities can also lead to formulating the wrong decision. The Kruger-Dunning Effect (published by Cornell psychologists Justin Kruger and David Dunning) describes how perceptions of ability are often at odds with actual ability. In other words, individuals of average and below-average skill tend to view themselves much higher in ability than they actually are. More significantly, they lack the self- awareness to realize this. Interesting enough, those of the highest ability tend to underestimate their performance. Perhaps the lesson here is that humility trumps valor when it comes to pushing the performance envelope. Driving a significant distance after a long flight is never pleasant, yet neither is explaining an overrun to an investigator by arguing that the manual specified the airplane could land in the available distance.Which method of decision-making is the best depends on the situation. With an abundance of time, accurate and sufficient information, and clearly defined objectives rational decision- making will typically out perform RPD. With limited time, uncertainty, vague goals, or rapidly changing conditions, intuition tends to be the better choice.One caveat here is that intuition is based on experience. Novice pilots may not have the depth and breadth of knowledge to lean on and may be better off with a detailed analysis of options. A classic case of failure to apply RPD occurred on January 13, 1982 when Air Florida flight 90, a 737, stalled on takeoff and plunged into the freezing Potomac River. During the takeoff roll the first officer noticed an abnormality with the exhaust pressure ratio, an indication of the percentage of thrust the aircraft was producing. The cockpitOCTOBER 2011