Page 33 - Volume 15 Number 10

propeller, if there was not time for restart or the restart attempt fails)• Fly the plane• Reference and perform theprinted checklistFollow the same pattern with any emergency or abnormal procedure checklist.Share the WorkloadIf you have another pilot within reach of the controls, divide the duties so one is flying the airplane while the other is dealing with theIf you have another pilot within reach of the controls, divide the duties so one is flying the airplane while the other is dealing with the abnormality. At the very least, assign A passenger the task of watching your altitude and direction, and looking out for obstacles or other airplanes while you deal with the scenario.abnormality. At the very least, assign any passenger the task of watch- ing your altitude and direction, and looking out for obstacles or other airplanes while you deal with the scenario.Most Twin & Turbine readers fly airplanes with autopilots. One of the best uses of an “automatic pilot” is to help you manage an emergency. To take advantage of this huge workload reducer you need to be extremely familiar with your autopilot’s operation and limitations. For instance, most autopilots do a superb job of flying a twin-engine airplane with one propeller feathered or a turbine shut down. But few make the transition from twin- to single- engine operation well. Why’s that?Consider your autopilot’s operating logic. It wants to keep the airplane on attitude or altitude, either of which may need to change quickly if an engine quits. Many autopilots don’t handle the need for a large, rapid trim change very precisely, yet lose an engine and the trim will need to change quickly, in a big way. Even if the autopilot didOCTOBER 2011TWIN & TURBINE • 31Mistaken PrioritiesA Piper PA46 was on an approach in night, visual meteorological conditions (VMC), when pilot and instructor experienced, in rapid succession, a partial power loss due to turbocharger failure, an alternator failure, loss of engine oil pressure, and an unsafe landing gear indication when they attempted to extend the gear. The pilots made a low fly-by of the Air Traffic Control tower to confirm the landing gear appeared down, then began a circling maneuver to return to a position to land. During the circling maneuver the engine caught fire and then failed altogether. The airplane descended into obstacles; one of the pilots aboard the Piper Malibu was killed and the other suffered serious injuries.The NTSB investigation revealed an improperly installed turbocharger, a cracked exhaust manifold and (what probably caused the total engine failure) a separated cylinder. An unrelated, improperly serviced hydraulic system that led to the landing gear issue was also discovered. Although it does not state why, the final report notes the mechanic who had most recently worked on the airplane had had his inspection authorization revoked by the FAA a year previ- ously. More telling, however, is that the report also states the instructor pilot had made an unintentional, gear-up landing in another aircraft two years before. The NTSB Probable Cause considers this significant enough to include this as a contributing factor, citing the pilot’s “faulty decision” to perform a fly-by to check the landing gear when making a night arrival with a failed turbocharger, most likely influenced by “his previous experience with a gear-up landing a couple of years before.”The Second Rule of emergencies is to point the airplane toward a landing area while you process the situation that caused the emergency in the first place. Subsequent status may amend how you respond to the initial indications, but it does not mitigate your response or reduce their severity. Ultimately we may have to choose whether getting the airplane on the ground is worth the risk of minor damage from an unrelated problem. Thinking in terms of the Second Rule can help you keep the relative risk of various conditions in perspective.