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You can trap many gotchas with a detailed preflight inspection.
Technologically sophisticated aircraft have improved aviation safety overall, but nothing replaces the value of basic piloting skills.
all fatal accidents. These numbers have been fairly consistent over the decades. The NTSB published an in-depth study on the issue in 2005. This study pig- gybacked a technique that was formed during the investigation into the JFK Jr accident in 1999. The NTSB identified and interviewed other pilots who had operated in the same area at the same time as the accident f light. The hope was to identify the specific differences be- tween those who successfully traversed areas of IMC versus those who perished.
The study captured data from 72 acci- dent flights. This was contrasted against 135 non-accident flights (which had successfully operated in the same conditions at the same time). The FAA provided the results of practical and written tests associated with the accident pilots. The NTSB also reviewed incidents and enforcement actions connected with them. Comprehen- sive as it was, it was far from the first paper that had been published on the phenomena of IMC fatalities. Studies in 1968, 1974, 1976, and 1989 also sought to discover why pilots keep dying in the clouds. For their part, the NTSB issued 82 recommendations related to IMC operations between
1968 and 2004.
The study determined several trends associated with ac-
cident pilots. These pilots were older than average. While a majority of the accidents involved non-instrument-rated pilots, a striking number involved those with advanced rat- ings. VFR f light into IMC was the main cause of accidents for non-instrument-rated pilots. Continuing an approach below minimums was the bane for the IFR crowd. Plan continu- ation error (a phrase coined in the study) is defined as the “failure to revise a flight plan despite emerging evidence that it is no longer safe to continue.” In the face of deterio- rating weather, continuing with the original plan can result in a potentially dangerous outcome. Yet this personality trait is ever-present in aviation. Unlike other errors that are inversely related to the number of flight hours a pilot possesses (i.e., fewer hours equals higher risk), continuation error tends to increase in proportion with flying experience. High-time pilots are some of the worst offenders.
At my previous employer, Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) data indicated, in one year, well over a thousand unstable approaches. The total number of these events was not really the issue (the data covered hundreds of thousands of flights), but rather the fact that only four go-arounds were accomplished out of the thousand-plus events. Our “professional” pilots proved to be highly resis- tant to modifying their original plan (executing a landing) when faced with emerging evidence that it was no longer safe to do so (an unstable condition). In aviation, the pro- cess is sometimes more important than the outcome. Safe on the ground following a go-around represents a success. Continuing a marginal approach is a failure – even if you manage to salvage a successful landing.
almost certainly survive (it is a very big sky). Lose track of your airspeed and the odds of survival rapidly diminish.
If you accumulate ice, the carefully considered aerody- namics of the engineers goes up in smoke. Airflow separa- tion will occur at a lower angle of attack (AOA). Stall speed is higher. Drag and weight increase as well. Performance is degraded. Many manufacturers dictate a minimum speed for operation in icing conditions. Follow it like your life depends on it (it does). If you have any doubt fly faster. Remember that extra airspeed requires a longer rollout on landing (tailwind additives provide a quick means to assess how much extra runway will be required – carrying an extra knot of approach speed is the same as experiencing an extra knot of tailwind). Choose a longer runway if you need to, but keep your speed up. Going slowly off the end is better than a spin at low altitude.
The Trick with IMC
IMC accidents result in fatalities two-thirds of the time that they occur. This is a much higher rate of fatalities than is found in other types of accidents. In 2004, 6 percent of all accidents occurred in IMC. The relatively high rate of fatali- ties in those accidents produced an outsized 25 percent of
November 2022 / TWIN & TURBINE • 9