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the DC-8 had multiple fuel tanks, at the time it only had 4,000 lbs total.
The captain instructed the flight engineer to calculate landing weight based on “another fifteen minutes” of flight. The captain suggested that they would have “three or four thousand pounds” of fuel remaining at touch- down. The flight engineer countered: “Not enough. Fifteen minutes is gonna really run us low on fuel here.” The aircraft continued to hold for several more minutes. Upon inquiry from Portland Approach, the captain re- ported: “...about four thousand, well, make it three thousand pounds of fuel.” The DC-8 was burning 220 lbs per min- ute. If a calculation had been made, it would have indicated that a paltry 13 minutes of endurance remained.
During the approach into Portland, the first officer (who was flying) re- quested flaps 15 and gear down. Post- accident interviews indicated an ab- normal thump followed the attempt to lower the gear. The annunciator lights on the main gear panel failed to illumi- nate, indicating an unsafe condition. The captain contacted approach con- trol and requested a holding pattern so the crew could troubleshoot the issue.
The DC-8 had a device that extended from the wing when the respective gear was down (which served as a backup to the indicating lights on the flight deck). The abnormal checklist stated that a normal approach and landing could be performed if these wing mounted devices were observed. The flight engineer verified that they were present. The captain initiated a conversation with United Airlines maintenance personnel. He reported 7,000 lbs of fuel remaining and his intention to continue holding for “an- other 15 to 20 minutes” (he wanted to provide f light attendants the abil- ity to comprehensively prepare pas- sengers for an emergency landing). In the configuration that the DC-8 maintained throughout the episode (gear down, f laps at 15-degrees), the NTSB calculated a consumption rate of 13,209 lbs per hour. Seven-thousand pounds of fuel, as such, represented 32-minutes of endurance. Had the captain stuck to his original time- line, the aircraft would have landed with 15 minutes of fuel remaining. Six
8 • TWIN & TURBINE / May 2022
minutes after this conversation, the first officer asked the f light engineer, “How much fuel we got?” The flight engineer responded, “Five thousand.” Two minutes later, the first officer repeated the question, receiving the same answer. Seconds later, the cap- tain noted that “the [fuel] feed pump [lights] are starting to blink.” Eight min- utes later, the first officer again asked about the fuel. The flight engineer an- swered (somewhat befuddling): “four thousand – in each – pounds.” Though
The next several minutes were eaten up with conversation about the readiness of the cabin and questions regarding whether spoilers or anti-skid would be functional on the ground. At 1806, the first officer announced that the number four engine was fail- ing. The captain – who was engaged in a conversation with the lead flight attendant – apparently missed the comment. Ten seconds later, the first officer stated, “We’re going to lose an engine.” The captain asked, “Why?”