Page 20 - Volume 17 Number 5

Twin Proficiency:Target:By Thomas P. TurnerSituational awareness, or SA, is sometimes used as a catchall term to explain away why someone suffered an accident. “He had bad situational awareness” is supposed to describe a scenario in which a pilot does the unthinkable, resulting in tragedy. There’s an element of “I would never do that” in adopting the “bad situational awareness” label, a comforting thought for the next time we launch into the blue or descend into the murk. But, knowing that the other pilot had “bad SA” does not ensure that you will somehow have “good SA” in similar circumstances. After all, it is often highly experienced pilots, or even crews of pilots, who find themselves the subject of “bad SA” accident reports.SA has many definitions. I propose a simple definition of SA as “the sum total of an aircrew’s perception of the facts and conditions affecting the safe outcome of a flight.” Emphasis is on perception – mechanical glitches or human factors can alter the facts as observed by the pilot. The trick, then, is to detect when there may be a discrepancy between perception and reality, and then to take action to resolve that discrepancy before it becomes critical. Often, taking action involves some sort of delay to slow the pace of information, allowing you time to sort things out.Reviewing a large number of “bad SA” accident reports reveals common clues to a loss of situational awareness. Recognize one of these tip-offs and you may be able to increase your situational awareness, to match your perceptions to reality and alter your immediate future.Losing SAATC advised the crew of a King Air that they were second for the localizer approach. The controller instructed the pilots to hold as published on the localizer course at 4,000 feet and to expect a 28-minute delay in the holding pattern. The King Air crossed the holding fix at 4,000 feet and turned outbound in the holding pattern. About that time, the airplane ahead of the King Air on the approach canceled its IFR clearance.While the King Air was still turning outbound in the holding pattern, the controller asked if the airplane was18 • TWIN & TURBINEestablished in the holding pattern. The crew confirmed, “We’re established.” The controller then cleared the King Air for the approach and requested the crew advise him when inbound. The crew completed a continuous right turn toward the inbound course and crossed the holding fix, which was also the Final Approach Fix (FAF), at an altitude of 3,900 feet – 1,300 feet above the altitude published for crossing the FAF inbound. The crew reported inbound on the approach.MAY 2013Situ Awaa r