Page 14 - March 18 TNT
P. 14
Twin Proviciency
by Thomas P. Turner
Avoiding Fuel Trouble
“Almost
half of pilots involved in fuel management accidents
hold either a Commercial
or Air Transport Pilot certificate.”
From an Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) report:
The pilot of a Beech Baron 58 aircraft contacted a refueler and requested 400 liters (about 105 U.S. gallons) of fuel be added to the aircraft. The refueller provided 200 liters of fuel, however the refueller recorded the amount provided as 400 liters.
At the end of the day, the refueller totaled the daily fuel delivery quantities and detected a 200 -liter discrepancy between the recorded deliveries and the fuel tank meter readings. The refueller identified that the discrepancy was due to an error in the refueling of the Baron in question. He immediately went to the aircraft to notify the pilot of the error. However, he was not able to locate the pilot. The refueler was then distracted by a phone call and forgot about the refueling error.
Eleven days later, another pilot prepared to conduct a ferry flight in the aircraft. The take- off and climb were uneventful. About 5 nm north of the planned destination, both engines failed. The pilot conducted a forced landing i n a paddock (pasture). During the landing roll the aircraft impacted a number of bushes. The pilot was not injured, however, the aircraft sustained substantial damage.
This incident underlines the importance of communication once an error has been discovered. The refueling error was discovered 11 days prior to the incident flight, however, this was not com- municated to the Baron’s operator or its pilots. Knowledge of the error would have enabled the pilots to correct the fuel log and avoid the incident.
And from the National Transportation Safety Board:
The pilot of a Piper Seneca departed in night instrument meteorological conditions with the airplane’s fuel tanks full, providing an estimated fuel endurance of four hours 50 minutes. Two hours 50 minutes into the flight, the pilot reported a loss of engine power on the right engine, followed by a loss of engine power on the left engine. The pilot attempted to land
at a nearby airport; however, the airplane impacted trees about 8 miles short of the airport. A review of weather information revealed no evidence of in-flight icing or other weather conditions that may have contributed to the accident.
The left engine fuel selector valve was found in the “X-FEED” (crossfeed) posi- tion. The right engine fuel selector was in the “ON” position. With the valves in these positions, both the left and right engines would have consumed fuel from the right fuel tank. Review of performance charts and fueling records indicated that if the flight was conducted with the valves in the as-found positions, exhaustion of the fuel in the airplane’s right fuel tank would have occurred about the time the pilot reported the dual engine failure. In addi- tion, the yaw trim was found in the full nose-right position. It is possible that the pilot used nose-right yaw trim to counteract an increasing left-turning tendency during the flight as fuel was burned from only the right wing’s fuel tank making it relatively lighter than the left wing.
According to the checklist in the Seneca Pilot’s Operating Handbook, during taxi the pilot was to move each fuel selector to “X-FEED” for a short time,
12 • TWIN & TURBINE
March 2018