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Weather is obviously important in the air, but it can also be critical during movement on the ground. Traction is reduced when operating at an airport with standing water, slush, snow or ice. Poor braking action generated by these surfaces can easily triple the required landing distance.
area was concrete, so I commented on it and let it go. If he had been on the edge of the paved surface instead, he would have stuck a tire in the mud. Airline crews get one retrainable event during a recurrent check ride. He got his sole strike before leaving the ground.
I had a captain applicant in another training session get lost during taxi at JFK airport. He justified himself by noting that the ownship function in Jeppesen (which uses the iPad GPS to display aircraft position on the airport diagram) did not function in the simulator. I explained that it does not always work in the real world either, and he needed to be able to figure it out with situational aware- ness and signage. He failed his upgrade checkride with another examiner after getting lost during the taxi (among other things). It is not just in the sim. A 737 knocked down a light pole with its wing while taxiing from the ramp at DFW airport a few years ago. The first officer was heads down during a congested part of the taxi attempt- ing to program the Flight Management System (FMS). The captain turned onto the double yellow line (taxiway edge) instead of the single yellow line (centerline). It did not help that the taxi line was faded. Still, it underscores the importance of knowing airport signs, markings and lighting. You really want to be 100 percent on this subject.
The Problem with Runways
Just before Thanksgiving in 1996, a Beech 1900C and a King Air A90 collided at the cross-point of runways 13 and 4 at Quincy Municipal Airport in Illinois. All 12 pas- sengers and crew were killed in the 1900 and two in the King Air. The cause of death for all occupants was smoke inhalation and fire (the collision resulted in a peak of 19 G’s in the 1900 and 30 G’s in the King Air, both survivable). It is interesting to note that Raytheon (who had purchased
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Beechcraft in 1980) argued with the NTSB to blame the crew of the 1900. Raytheon had a vested interest. The NTSB had pinned partial blame for the fatalities on the inability of the first officer to open the airstair door (his body was found in proximity to this exit). The captain, who was trapped in the cockpit, pleaded with first responders to “get the door open.” According to witnesses, she survived for approximately 120 seconds prior to succumbing to smoke inhalation. Raytheon argued that the deaths were primarily due to negligent operation during flight (they pointed at the decision to shoot a straight-in approach at an uncontrolled airport – a technique that is not prohib- ited – and the fact that the crew had exceeded 250 knots below 10,000 feet). The NTSB denied Raytheon’s appeal.
The cause of the collision itself was never in question. The pilot of the King Air failed to communicate (or effec- tively monitor) the Common Traffic Advisory Frequency (CTAF) prior to takeoff. This was not the mistake of a novice. The pilot had accumulated 25,000 hours of flight time over the course of his career. He was a retired TWA pilot who had reached the rank of Colonel with the U.S. Air Force. He was an active CFI and a part-time air taxi pilot. His CV, however, was not without blemish. Follow- ing a certificate action due to a gear-up incident on an instructional training flight, the responding FAA examiner reported that he had made statements “to the effect that he was a retired U.S. Air Force Colonel...and that a gear-up [landing] did not mean anything.” His student in the gear- up incident testified that the pilot oftentimes “seemed to be in a hurry” and rushed him during training sessions.
A second non-pilot occupant of the King Air made a CTAF call “holding short of runway four” two min- utes before the collision. On short final, the 1900 crew