Page 32 - 207034_Jan19T_FINAL3

From the Flight Deck
by Kevin R. Dingman
Debrief
Errors of omission and commission: Remembering lessons learned.
An error of omission is not doing some- thing that we should have done like forget- ting to put the gear down, not feathering a prop during an engine failure or ne- glecting to load an arrival/approach into the FMS. An error of commission is the mistake of doing something, but doing it wrong such as extending the gear but while too fast, feathering the wrong prop during an engine failure or loading the FMS with the wrong arrival/approach. Despite Ernie’s A-B-C, and ARROW, PAVE, CIGAR, GUMP, Identify, Verify, Feather and several dozen other memory mne- monics, litanies and checklists developed over the years, we continue to make er- rors of omission and commission. Most of our mistakes are small and of little consequence, but the potential for a seri- ous blunder looms over us like the sword of Damocles. By reviewing significant events from our flights, a technique em- ployed in the military (and the airlines and corporate), we can reduce both types of errors. This tool reinforces the good and helps us to avoid repeating the bad; it’s called a debrief.
Doctorate Level Epiphany
A fellow F-16 pilot sent me an article from BCA (Business and Commercial Aviation) magazine about military briefings and debriefings. The story focused on the methods and practices learned during Vietnam which led to the creation of
the Navy and Air Force Fighter Weapon Schools. The BCA article reminded me of the tenacity we employed in learning from the events during each mission as fighter pilots. While flying the F-16 at Nellis AFB in Nevada, we were often tasked to sup- port USAF Fighter Weapon School training sorties. Sometimes we acted as the air-to- air bad guys trying to shoot them down, and other times as the air-to-ground bad guys trying to drop bombs on their air- fields, military machinery and other high- value assets – like their golf course. In both the air-to-air and air-to-ground scenarios, the Fighter Weapon School student’s mis- sion was to intercept us and to shoot us down. During the doctorate-level briefings and debriefings for these missions (typi- cally twice as long as the actual flight), we “operational” fighter pilots discovered the value and benefit of a best-of-the-best, detailed and critical debrief and we began to sit-in on the briefings even when not participating in the missions. I invite you to experience just such an epiphany.
Squirming Hatch Blower
Even though the piloting profession was in on the ground floor of using checklists, we continue to skip things accidentally (or intentionally if we think it’s already completed) and then we swear (often liter- ally) that we will never make that mistake again. Many of us fly as PIC with no SIC so we can’t expect checklist assistance or
a critique from the other pilot. Therefore, any criticism will have to come from a self-deprecating admission.
To wit: I’ve been slow to retract the gear in the Duke during an oh-dark-thirty departure, forgotten the flaps on a missed approach, lowered the gear way too early during an approach in ice, worn work boots and landed with a brake pedal de- pressed(“BigFootFliesAgain,”T&T May, 2018), failed to press the execute-approach button on the GPS/FMS, forgotten to move the fuel cross feed valves back to normal after a ground check, ran the wing of an MD80 into a deice truck (not my fault – see “Wintertime Blues,” T&T February, 2016), almost went into an inverted spin when I over-controlled a training spin in the T-37 and I recovered an F-16 from a computer- induced near deep-stall during a main- tenance test flight (“Paper Airplanes,” T&T May, 2011).
I’ve also left the door unlatched in a B36TC, hit the tail of a PA28 with a roll of toilet paper while in flight (“The Pilots Mom,”T&T May,2016),almostslidoff an icy runway in a Cherokee 140, briefly caught a C-150 engine on fire during an over-primed start, got way too slow on a real, single-engine approach in the Duke – and these are just the ones that I’m willing to admit. Twenty-three thousand hours has given me plenty of time to make mis- takes and to even repeat some of them. I’m certain that I wasn’t the first, nor will I be the last, to commit a squirming-hatch- blower faux pas. So, is there something more than self-deprecation that we in- trepid aviators can use to defend ourselves from Ernie Gann’s probabilities of fate?
The Debrief Diary
Debriefing a flight from start to fin- ish allows us to examine and learn from the good, the bad and the ugly (Clint Eastwood, 1966). But after f lying
“A stood for altimeter. It told how high a man flew. B stood for boost. It told the power in the engines. C stood for compass. It told in which direction a man was proceeding. It was delightfully simple.”
– Ernest K. Gann, Island in the Sky.
30 • TWIN & TURBINE January 2019
I found her diary underneath a tree. And started reading about me... – “Diary” by Bread, 1972