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systems. Totalizers can be very effective in avoiding fuel exhaustion, but only if the initial data is accurate and there are no leaks.
Goal orientation. Pilots are goal-oriented; we want to get there. People can rationalize away a lot of data—such as insufficient fuel on board—when focused a specific, desirable outcome, like arriving on schedule.
Reinforcement. The first time a pilot stretches his/ her fuel limits, he or she is undoubtedly very nervous or concerned. If the flight ends uneventfully, the pilot is rewarded for taking the extra risk—even if an element of luck was involved. Over time, the pilot may develop a comfort level with situations that earlier would have seemed unacceptably risky, “pushing the limits” even more, until the day luck runs out.
Failure to prepare. Pilots may plan to arrive with a minimum safe amount of fuel, only to find the runway closed and the nearest alternate just beyond range. Or, weather or ATC may dictate a larger-than-expected portion of the trip is done at lower altitudes, with higher fuel burns and reduced true airspeed.
Failure to manage. We instructors don’t usually do a good job of teaching fuel and engine management. Consequently, pilots don’t often have a clear command of engine management technique. If a pilot merely expects the airplane to get “book” fuel burn, and does not cross-check actual performance, stretching range may prove catastrophic.
Basing range on miles instead of time. There’s great hazard in thinking of airplane range instead of endurance, and to make trip length and diversion decisions based on distance to be traveled instead of time aloft.
Confusing cruise fuel burn for fuel requirements. Pilots may assume sufficient fuel is aboard on takeoff based on hourly cruise fuel burn, but fail to account for much higher burn rates on takeoff and climb that turn a do-able trip into a fuel exhaustion event.
Resignation. A pilot lands with minimum fuel reserves, only to find the fuel truck won’t start, or the tank is contaminated, or the FBO ran out of fuel. Now what? Does the pilot attempt a hop over to a nearby airport, even though there’s minimal reserve? Will the pilot account for the higher fuel burn on takeoff and climb? Resignation is one of the bad pilot attitudes FAA warned us about. Pilots can become resigned to “make a short hop” for fuel, and not even consider driving, or waiting for more fuel, because they are just too inconvenient.
Escaping the trap
The key to avoiding these human factors-driven fuel exhaustion causes is to recognize them as active conspirators against you. Vow never to let them win. Stick with hard-and-fast fuel rules. First, plan for at least one hour’s reserve. Then, monitor actual fuel burn, with an
14 • TWIN & TURBINE
JANUARY 2014