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Loss of Control:
Latest FAA Guidance
by Ed Verville
In-flight loss of control (LOC-I) is the leading cause of fatal accidents for both commercial and general avia- tion accidents. The FAA recently
provided new guidance for stall pre- vention and recovery as well as modifi- cations of Full Flight Simulators (FFS) to provide Extended Envelope Train- ing (EET) – higher fidelity beyond the current limitations.
Some of the requirements went into effect in March 2019, with the remaining provisions going into ef- fect in March 2020. The regulatory re- quirements are currently only directed toward FAR Part 121 airline training programs, but the FAA recommends that all air carriers, airplane operators, pilot schools and training centers fol- low the new guidance.
The Years Leading Up
In addition to the Federal Avi- ation Administration (FAA), the
International Air Transport Associ- ation (IATA), the National Transpor- tation Board (NTSB) and AOPA’s Joseph T. Nall Report all state that stall/loss of control in-f light is the most frequent category of fatal acci- dents. Three of the most discussed accidents are Pinnacle Airlines Flight 3701 (October 2004), Colgan Air Flight 3407 (February 2009) and Air France Flight 447 (June 2009).
In response, the FAA changed how jet aircraft recover from stalls. Rather than powering out of the stall while attempting to maintain altitude, as previously taught, the new procedure was to reduce the angle of attack (as we had always done in general aviation airplanes and military fighter jets) and also to “annunciate stall.” This was to share information in the cockpit. For example, if one crew member was aware of a stall, they were required
to share that information with others by stating they were stalling. Sounds like good CRM. This requirement was put into effect in 2012 with the imple- mentation of Change 4 of the FAA ATP Practical Test Standards.
The new guidance in 2012 seemed promising, but pilots continue to stall and crash airplanes. A recent exam- ple occurred in March of 2018 when a Challenger jet departed to Dubai. While f lying near the Persian Gulf climbing to Flight Level 380, the jet experienced a problem with the pitot tubes and Air Data Computer. The pilot’s and co-pilot’s airspeed indica- tors subsequently began to diverge. An EFIS COMP MON caution message (Comparator Monitor) appeared, and the pilot’s airspeed went above .85, past MMO. This also resulted in an audible “clacker” indicating an over- speed situation – a situation not very
18 • TWIN & TURBINE / December 2020 Jet Journal