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28 • TWIN & TURBINE April 2018
boundary between the ramp and the taxiway is defined by two yellow lines, one solid and one dashed. The solid line is on the non-movement side and the single dashed line is on the move- ment side. At the runway, the dashed line is double and on the runway side of the solid line. The way I remember which side is which, is that the dashed lines are like yellow tire skid marks and are always on whichever side of the solid line the airplanes are moving faster. Out on the airfield that is on the runway side of the solid line. Back at the ramp, the dashed yellow skid marks are on the airfield side of the solid line, away from the ramp.
I’m based in Chicago with my Part 121 carrier and ground traffic there is continuous and oftentimes intense. I feel sor- ry for pilots that are less familiar with ORD because I know how they feel. When we go to CLT, MIA or IAH, I feel like a student pilot on a solo cross-country. My situational aware- ness becomes strained, especially during low visibility,
when it is dark or when the painted markings are wet and shiny. Thank goodness for an FO and the ability to see a real-time display of our aircraft on the airport diagram page. But occasion- ally that is not enough
Standby to Copy a Phone Number
My one-and-only pilot deviation (not at ORD and long since expunged) involved unauthorized crossing of a
movement area boundary. Due to a poorly worded ATIS that conflicted with published procedures, our polished MD-80 was pushed back from the gate across a non-movement boundary and partially onto a taxiway, without us contacting ground first.
They didn’t like it much and gave us one of those “standby to copy a phone number” radio calls. Me and my FO both filed an ASAP (NASA report) but our explanation was not accepted into the program and we received a “this will be in your offi- cial record with no further action necessary” admonishment. Crossing a ramp non-movement boundary like we did may disturb ground control’s plan for entropy in the universe (see “Control Freaks,” Twin & Turbine Feb. 2018), but an unplanned excursion onto a runway can cause an actual catastrophe.
What’s the Worst That Could Happen?
A terrorist incident at Gran Canaria Airport began a chain of events that led to the deadliest ground accident in aviation history. The terrorist incident caused flights to be diverted from Gran Canaria to Los Rodeos, including the two accident aircraft. The airport is 2,077 feet above sea level and drifting clouds were causing extremely low visibility.
I’ve encountered this phenomenon on Mackinac Island, Mich- igan. Ceilings and visibilities on the mainland could be 1,000/3 while on the island, which juts up 740 feet above Lake Huron, it could be obscured and half-mile. Forty-one years ago, two Boeing 747’s, KLM Flight 4805 and Pan Am Flight 1736 collid- ed on the runway at Los Rodeos Airport (now Tenerife North Airport), in the Canary Islands. The Pan Am flight missed a planned turn-off while back-taxiing. Then, confusion on the ra- dio, non-standard phraseology and perhaps a rushed decision, led the KLM captain to take off without clearance and was the primary cause of the accident. Watch a re-enactment here:
https://youtu.be/O7z69ikk4Lg
Runway confusion is a subset of runway incursions and can result in us unintentionally taking off or landing on a taxiway or the wrong runway. In August 2006, the crew of a regional jet was cleared for takeoff on Runway 22, but mistakenly de- parted from runway 26, a much shorter runway. They crashed off the end of the runway. And lining up to land on the wrong surface is what happened at SFO last year and almost resulted in an accident with even more casualties than at Tenerife (see “Those That Will,” Twin & Turbine Sept. 2017).
Thorough planning is essential for safe taxi operations. We should give as much attention to planning our taxi as given to other phases of flight, including confirming we are on the
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