Page 19 - Volume 16 Number 4

fated descent from MDA? No, the weather and time constraints were being met, although barely. Were the operators of the airport to be blamed for permitting arrivals in poor weather? No, they were simply serving a public need by providing a landing spot for eager patrons. The crash was, more than anything, the result of a mission-oriented focus, which over-rode caution flags whipping in the snowy night.
In military parlance, the term used in such cases is missionitis, when an obsession to “get the job done” overrides the obvious evidence of risk. During armed conflict, if bombs have to be delivered to destroy a dam, losing an aircraft or two in the process is the price that must be paid for advancing the end of the war. Combat crews have to go, because the mission demands it; coming back is optional. This is rarely the case in civilian flying.
That perfectly avoidable accidents happen, despite fully-functional equipment and precise flying, can be the result of letting the mission drive one’s actions. It will, perhaps, be a feather in the pilot’s cap if he delivers the occupants to their intended spot in a timely manner. Diverting to an alternate inconveniences the persons in the back of the plane and causes much loss of face. Most likely, we’ve all felt some pressure to complete a flight, at all costs.
Reticence Rules
I have been an observer in cockpits where two pilots were more or less equally ranked, each respecting the other’s position, but both unwilling to voice a concern as a situation deteriorated. The trip’s challenges notwithstanding, tacit, unspoken consent was thereby given
to risk-laden actions. A post-flight discussion revealed that the pilot flying had been secretly wishing his non-flying companion would speak up, and all the while the second pilot was doing the same. If either would have voiced doubt and started a discussion of options, consideration would have been given to a diversion. But, as it was, neither individual wanted to lose face or appear to distrust the other’s ability. So, the airplane continued on, the pilots silently withholding their concerns, eager to complete the mission.
How can we make sure the mission is not over-riding good judgment and safe flying practices? Just by following the FARs? If the book says we can’t do it, we don’t go...right? Ah, but in the real world, it may be a different matter. Bend the rules successfully once, and the next time a similar decision must be made, it
sionitis
APRIL 2012 TWIN & TURBINE 17