Safety, in an operational sense, is a building block process. Good preflight practices set the stage for ground handling, which sets the stage for takeoff, climb, cruise, descent, approach, taxiing, parking and tying down. The failure of an individual element can result in not only a costly incident but a dangerous one as well. Good preparation leads to good execution. Process is as important as skill. Experience and education round out the safety circle. What you do on the ground is as important as what you do in the air.
Developing a process that ensures the completion of preflight duties prior to movement is critical. Combining taxiing with other tasks should be avoided when able and mitigated when not. A good percentage of ground mishaps occur within the context of a task-saturated pilot. Always maintain awareness of your mental load. Are you green, yellow or red? When you are in the green, you are several steps ahead of the aircraft. You know how many intersections before the next turn, where exactly you are in relation to the runway, performance calculations for takeoff have been computed, the flight plan has been programmed, and you are ready to go. If you get a reroute during taxi (or a runway change that affects takeoff performance), you will slip into the yellow. Your vision will shift from a thousand yards to a hundred. In the red, you are dangling from the tail. Green means go. Yellow means slow. And red means stop. Simple, but hard.
The Preflight Process
I have yet to meet a pilot who loves calculating weight and balance. Years ago, I used Sheppard Air to prepare for my ATP written. At the time, the performance calculations for the exam involved a myriad of spaghetti charts. It was easy to get lost in them. Even when you used them correctly, you would end up with four different results out of four identical attempts. For their part, Sheppard focused on a mnemonic to memorize the correct answers to those questions. If you wanted to obtain reliable test results, it was pointless to drill technique. I formed an intense distrust of shorthand charts from that test bank. It bordered on hatred. I doubt that was what the FAA had intended. For what it is worth, memorization worked. I scored 100 percent on the test. When I was younger, I wasted a lot of time pursuing perfection. I would not be a worse pilot today had I gotten an 85 percent on it.
My first captain job was on a BE-1900. Over the course of two years, I calculated thousands of weight and balances. We used a calculator and Whiz Wheel (a circular slide rule) for the computations. It was more reliable than the spaghetti charts. Out of five attempts, I would end up with only three different answers. Today, of course, everything is on an app. And while technological reliance represents a real danger to pilots, when it comes to math, it is absolutely the right tool for the job. Apps such as ForeFlight incorporate weight and balance into the preflight flow with an eye on human factors. There is nothing wrong with operating an aircraft under a “standard weight and balance” (full tanks and only the pilot on board). But you should still pause briefly on this task, even if it is simply to confirm that “standard” conditions actually exist. Knowing weight and balance prior to taxi is the first step in decluttering ground operations.
Good preflight practices set the stage for ground handling, which sets the stage for takeoff, climb, cruise, descent, approach, taxiing, parking and tying down… what you do on the ground is as important as what you do in the air.”
With every seat filled and a haul of baggage, you may find that fuel calculations have suddenly become critical. Just like with weight and balance, aviation apps take quite a bit of mystery out of this. Still, if you are getting close to minimum regulatory fuel, it is important to consider additional factors. If you are operating into a remote airport, will “destination plus 45” be enough to get you to a safe alternate should an aircraft become disabled on the sole runway? Fuel stops are a hassle, but being nervous about your fuel load will inevitably narrow your vision for every other required task. Make a stop and enjoy the view.
Pilots need to establish oversight into every aspect of aircraft servicing. If someone screws something up on the ground, we are the ones who pay for it. A high-performance aircraft can be confused with a turbine. A small turbine can be confused with a piston. Do not take it for granted that the fueler will know whether you were asking for Kerosine or 100LL. Pounds versus gallons can be an issue as well. The prevalence of different units of measurement (particularly when flying internationally) also represents a risk. Each one of these scenarios has caused crashes. Even before you have started the engines, there are a half-dozen different categories of aircraft mishaps lying in wait. An established, reliable and familiar preflight process is the easiest solution to getting off on the right foot. A comprehensive app/subscription (e.g., ForeFlight) is a good step in the right direction. As with all technological aids, the app universe requires proficiency. The toughest part of current tech is the fact that updates constantly tinker with the user interface. While these updates seek to establish better processes, it also requires users to continually adapt.
Weather
Units of measurement can be a problem with weather as well. On a recent flight to Puerto Rico, the Terminal Area Forecast (TAF) deteriorated for our alternate of Punta Cana (located in the Dominican Republic). Approach minimums were depicted in kilometers. The TAF reported visibility in thousands of…feet? Meters? We honestly did not know. The regional manual for the airport was no help. It stated that either feet, kilometers or meters could be used. The units in use made the difference between a legal alternate or the need for something else. Our Jeppesen app came to the rescue. Utilizing the “plain language” function, we were able to determine that visibility was forecast in meters (the 6000 on the TAF was converted to 3SM). Once we knew it was meters, figuring out the rest was easy.
Weather is obviously important in the air, but it can also be critical during movement on the ground. Traction is reduced when operating at an airport with standing water, slush, snow or ice. Poor braking action generated by these surfaces can easily triple the required landing distance. Contamination increases the takeoff run as well. Crosswinds on slick surfaces have caught more than one pilot unaware. Aircraft weathervane more aggressively when tire grip is limited, and nose-wheel steering on these surfaces is less effective. Slick surfaces call for slower taxi speeds and may also require an adapted sequence of preflight activities. Safe ground handling begins with reviewing cold weather procedures prior to “firing them up.” If specific limitations are not published for your aircraft, consider reducing crosswind limits in half for operations with medium braking action. Cut it in half again if it is poor. While manufacturer cold weather data reigns supreme, guidance can also be found via the FAA, AOPA and aircraft-specific owners’ groups.
Taxiing
You cannot discuss ground safety without talking about taxiing. What you do prior to movement has a profound impact here as well. It is good to familiarize yourself with the expected taxi route prior to contacting ground. It is also a good idea to have the proper frequencies in the active and standby radios for the progression from ground to tower to departure. Any published hot spots that you might encounter should be reviewed. Be wary of runway-taxiway intersections. You need to be solely focused on the outside world when operating in these locations. Vitally important (and easy to overlook) is maintaining fluency in airport signs, markings and lighting. Do you know what a double solid and dashed yellow line means? Which side of this marking is the runway, and which side is the taxiway? How about an ILS-protected area? When do you need clearance to cross the boundary? (Technically, only when ATC has instructed you to hold short of the protected area. This may occur with a ceiling of less than 800 feet or visibility of less than 2 miles). When approaching a direction sign for a crossing taxiway, is the sign before or after the indicated taxiway? (It is before it).
Though a mere 85 percent on an ATP written may not be a big deal, being only 85 percent on airport markings and lighting is. A few years ago, I was performing a recurrent check ride on a crew. The captain was a line check airman (another instructor). The first officer was a line pilot. The scenario in the simulator began with a nighttime taxi at Boston Logan airport. At this airport, taxiway Alpha curves at a 70-degree angle when approaching runway 15R. The captain straddled the blue taxi lights in the turn. The problem, of course, is that blue lights delineate the edge of the taxiway. Green lights are the center. The entire area was concrete, so I commented on it and let it go. If he had been on the edge of the paved surface instead, he would have stuck a tire in the mud. Airline crews get one retrainable event during a recurrent check ride. He got his sole strike before leaving the ground.
I had a captain applicant in another training session get lost during taxi at JFK airport. He justified himself by noting that the ownship function in Jeppesen (which uses the iPad GPS to display aircraft position on the airport diagram) did not function in the simulator. I explained that it does not always work in the real world either, and he needed to be able to figure it out with situational awareness and signage. He failed his upgrade checkride with another examiner after getting lost during the taxi (among other things). It is not just in the sim. A 737 knocked down a light pole with its wing while taxiing from the ramp at DFW airport a few years ago. The first officer was heads down during a congested part of the taxi attempting to program the Flight Management System (FMS). The captain turned onto the double yellow line (taxiway edge) instead of the single yellow line (centerline). It did not help that the taxi line was faded. Still, it underscores the importance of knowing airport signs, markings and lighting. You really want to be 100 percent on this subject.
The Problem with Runways
Just before Thanksgiving in 1996, a Beech 1900C and a King Air A90 collided at the cross-point of runways 13 and 4 at Quincy Municipal Airport in Illinois. All 12 passengers and crew were killed in the 1900 and two in the King Air. The cause of death for all occupants was smoke inhalation and fire (the collision resulted in a peak of 19 G’s in the 1900 and 30 G’s in the King Air, both survivable). It is interesting to note that Raytheon (who had purchased Beechcraft in 1980) argued with the NTSB to blame the crew of the 1900. Raytheon had a vested interest. The NTSB had pinned partial blame for the fatalities on the inability of the first officer to open the airstair door (his body was found in proximity to this exit). The captain, who was trapped in the cockpit, pleaded with first responders to “get the door open.” According to witnesses, she survived for approximately 120 seconds prior to succumbing to smoke inhalation. Raytheon argued that the deaths were primarily due to negligent operation during flight (they pointed at the decision to shoot a straight-in approach at an uncontrolled airport – a technique that is not prohibited – and the fact that the crew had exceeded 250 knots below 10,000 feet). The NTSB denied Raytheon’s appeal.
The cause of the collision itself was never in question. The pilot of the King Air failed to communicate (or effectively monitor) the Common Traffic Advisory Frequency (CTAF) prior to takeoff. This was not the mistake of a novice. The pilot had accumulated 25,000 hours of flight time over the course of his career. He was a retired TWA pilot who had reached the rank of Colonel with the U.S. Air Force. He was an active CFI and a part-time air taxi pilot. His CV, however, was not without blemish. Following a certificate action due to a gear-up incident on an instructional training flight, the responding FAA examiner reported that he had made statements “to the effect that he was a retired U.S. Air Force Colonel…and that a gear-up [landing] did not mean anything.” His student in the gear-up incident testified that the pilot oftentimes “seemed to be in a hurry” and rushed him during training sessions.
A second non-pilot occupant of the King Air made a CTAF call “holding short of runway four” two minutes before the collision. On short final, the 1900 crew inquired as to whether the “aircraft” was still holding short of the runway. A Piper Cherokee (who was holding short behind the King Air) stated that he was holding short of the runway. He followed up with a transmission that was partially blocked by an automated GPWS callout on the 1900: “…on the uh, King Air.” Likely he was communicating that the King Air was on the runway. The King Air began its takeoff run approximately 13 seconds before the 1900 touched down. The 1900 crew was not alerted to this.
Runways are dangerous, high-speed environments. Uncontrolled airports add to the risk factor. A healthy scan of intersecting runways (as well as the runway of intended landing) is a good idea. However, in an already high-workload environment, this can be difficult to accomplish. Good radio etiquette is also important, as is the awareness that others may not be actively hearing your transmissions. Any operation around a runway demands your complete and total attention. Any task not associated with the operation of the aircraft should be suspended when approaching or occupying a runway. Do not be in a rush. The consequences can be dire.
