OPF to SFO
Yesterday, on a flight from Miami, FL, to San Francisco, CA, we received a FLAPS FAIL yellow caution message as we attempted to deploy the flaps from the cruise setting of zero flaps to 20 degrees while on the initial approach to ILS Runway 28R at San Francisco (KSFO). The flight was a fairly long one, even cruising at Mach .80 with the nearly 100-knot headwind we encountered most of the way. I had a great first officer and flight attendant who helped the situation transition smoothly and safely. Ironically, this was our second yellow caution message during this flight. At our cruise altitude of Flight Level 380 (about 38,000 feet), we received a Stall Fail yellow caution message. The QRH (Quick Reference Handbook) directed us to turn off the airplane’s stick pusher device and add ten knots to our final approach speed. There is nothing “quick” about the manufacturer’s Quick Reference Handbook. It is a tabbed book three inches thick that does not read smoothly. It provides the aircraft manufacturer’s guidance for emergencies and abnormalities in a checklist format that reads, “If this, then do this.” It can direct you to other sections without a reminder to come back and finish the one you were on. It may say things nearly as imprudent as a bomb technician’s manual that says, “Cut the blue wire, but first cut the green wire.” Ok, maybe not that bad. Fortunately, we spend hours in flight simulators working through these QRH checklists with simulated emergencies.
Now, while on the initial approach for the Instrument Landing System (ILS) at SFO we received the FLAPS FAIL caution message. I was the pilot flying, so I also took the radio duties from the first officer and directed him to “run the QRC procedure for the FLAPS FAIL caution message.” The QRH directed us to turn on all the hydraulic B pumps. An interesting note as the flaps on our airplane are electrically powered. Based on “systems knowledge” from ground school and simulator training, we know that turning on the B pumps is required because the B pumps normally activate when the flaps are extended (technically beyond 4 degrees), and with a FLAPS FAIL situation, they were not going to extend, and the backup pumps would not come on automatically. The QRH then had us do some performance calculations for a no-flap or zero-flap landing. The QRH indicated that we had to add 30 knots to the final approach speed to land with the smaller wing. This increased our landing speed from 125 knots to 155 knots or 178.25 MPH. The additions to the landing speed are not cumulative so we did not have to add 10 knots for the STALL FAIL and 30 knots for the FLAPS FAIL for a 40-knot additive. We just had to use the largest penalty. This is a pretty fast speed over the runway threshold and is going to require a lot more runway to land and safely come to a stop. We did the performance computations for the additional landing distance and noted that it would not be a problem. Fortunately, Runway 28R at KSFO is 11,870 feet long so we had plenty of room for our long landing and could make a right turn near the end of the runway and roll into Signature Aviation Flight Support, the FBO. The airplane wanted to float along the runway just as it had always done in the flight simulator. We had a smooth touchdown and a long rollout while bleeding off the excess speed. If this had occurred at one of the smaller airports we frequent, such as Van Nuys, CA or Teterboro, NJ we would have had to divert to LAX or JFK for longer runways.
This was my first FLAP FAIL at zero flaps. I have had two previous flap failures at partial flaps that did not require as large of an airspeed additive. I still felt comfortable during the approach and landing as I had done it a hundred times before in the flight simulator. And, I had just practiced this simulation during my recurrent training the week before at FlightSafety International. (Thanks, FSI, and to my passengers and crew).
We have certainly seen a rash of airline and corporate airplane accidents in the past few weeks. Recently, Delta Connection, Endeavor Airlines had a horrific landing accident in Toronto, Canada flipping the airplane over. Just before that accident, we had the midair collision between a CRJ-700 and an Army Blackhawk Helicopter over the Potomac River at Washington’s DCA Airport. A few days later a Learjet landing at Scottsdale, AZ had the landing gear collapse and ran off the runway striking another airplane.
All this has caused me to reflect on some of my own inflight emergencies. I have five overweight landings in airliners. Note that we can only land overweight in an airplane for an emergency. Two of them were for smoke in the cockpit, a very scary thing on airplanes, submarines, and boats. The first was just after takeoff when the flight attendant chimed the cockpit and said, “I have smoke back here.” I responded with what were not likely the most comforting words “I have smoke up here.” The Captain and I (the first officer) donned our oxygen masks and began running the emergency QRH for “Smoke and Fire.” We returned to the airport for an overweight landing at CVG Airport with crash, fire, and rescue equipment following us down the runway. We ordered an emergency evacuation and got everyone off the airplane safely albeit very cold as it was winter in Northern Kentucky just across the river from Cincinnati. We later learned that the airplane’s auxiliary power unit (a small jet engine in the aft equipment bay) had catastrophically died and dumped oil into the PACKs, the air-conditioning units, filling the airplane with smoke. We had switched the high-pressure bleed air from the APU to the engines per the QRH. This decreased the amount of smoke on the flight deck and made the landing easier, although still challenging wearing smoke and oxygen masks.
The crew received a follow-up phone call from a chief pilot (our boss). After learning all the passengers and crew were safe, he asked if we were good to continue with our daily flight schedule. After a critical incident, the crew can take the rest of the day off to process the event. As pilots, we felt we should “press on” and continued with our scheduled flights. As I reflect on this, I am not sure that was the wisest decision.
My second Smoke and Fire was again right after takeoff. This one exhibited a strong electrical odor immediately after takeoff. We did not have visual smoke or fire, but the fumes were enough for us to immediately return for an overweight emergency landing. Large airplanes have a heavier takeoff weight approval, than for landing. The crews account for this by the fuel they will burn while enroute to their destination. After landing, with crash, fire, and rescue (CFR) again behind and alongside us, we made the decision to taxi back to the gate rather than order an emergency evacuation. This decision was made because the odor was decreasing, there was no sign of actual smoke or fire, and for passenger safety as injuries such as broken ankles often occur during an evacuation. We did have the fire department’s CFR following and monitoring us on both sides of the airplane. Upon investigation, maintenance discovered that some avionics wiring had shorted out.
My third overweight/emergency landing was due to an engine failure. We were in a brand-new Bombardier CRJ-700 Regional Jet. It still had that “new jet smell.” I enjoyed the new CRJ-700 jets. They had a higher thrust-to-weight ratio, more range, and carried more passengers. (A CRJ-200 has a max ramp weight of 53,000 lbs. with 8,729 lbs. of thrust on each engine, while a CRJ-700 has a max ramp weight of 76,000 lbs. with 12,670 lbs. of thrust on each engine). As we were flying over Northern New York to Atlanta Hartsfield Airport, there was roughness on the right engine. The VIB Guage (engine vibration detector) alerted us, but we were already feeling it. The flight attendants in the back also called us and advised that they had an unusual vibration. While troubleshooting, yes, using the QRH again, it directed us to retard the thrust lever to idle. When we did this, the VIB gauge went to full deviation and the felt vibration increased. We next shut down the engine (per the QRH of course) and declared an emergency. You get great service when you use that word. ATC (FAA Air Traffic Control) directed us to the nearest large airport, Pittsburgh, for the end of our descent where I flew the engine-out-approach into visual meteorological conditions, backing up the visual approach with the ILS. It was both a little startling as this rarely happens with modern jet engines, but was also a bit exciting, as not many people get to do this! The approach and landing were uneventful, and again, flew just like the sim. We later learned that some of the Fan Blades on the engine “were out of spec,” and never received any further information.
Another immediate return after takeoff that was not an overweight landing occurred at Atlanta Hartsfield Airport in Georgia, the busiest airport in the world. At 400 feet AGL we received a Hydraulic Low Pressure yellow caution message. All the fluid had leaked out under the 3,000 lbs. of pressure in the system due to a tiny hole in the hydraulic tubing. Fortunately, we only lost fluid on one of our three hydraulic systems. After requesting an immediate return to the airport and advising ATC of the urgent situation but not necessarily an emergency, ATC gave us priority service. ATC stated something like: What runway would you like, would you like us to roll the equipment, and what else can I do for you, sir?” Again, great service, and from the busiest airport in the world. (Thanks, ATC). I wound up overnighting in Atlanta and catching a Cheryl Crow concert.
My General Aviation (GA) emergencies in propellor airplanes far exceed my jet emergencies. The reliability and redundancies are just not there. In addition to my one jet engine failure or shutdown, I have had three engine failures in GA airplanes. One was a turbo-charger failure in a Twin Cessna 414. But when it happens at 21,000 feet the engine indications are the same. My other two were in a PA-44 Piper Seminole and a C-172 Cessna.
These four engine failures do not count the five engine “failures” I have had while conducting check rides in multi-engine airplanes. Checkride pilot candidates generally do not display or at least hide the hazardous attitudes described by the FAA, such as anti-authority and macho. But the one they do not hide is impulsivity (Those who feel the need to do something, anything, immediately). During FAA multiengine check rides, the examiner must observe the candidate fully shut down an engine and maneuver the airplane with the engine shut down and the propellor feathered. I have had five pilots shut down the wrong engine after I have induced a failure on the other engine. I may do something like move the mixture to idle-cutoff to simulate an engine failure. The inappropriate responses have included feathering the wrong propellor, turning off the wrong fuel selector, and turning off both magnetos to the operating engine. All done so quickly that I could not stop them.
These impulsive “double engine failures” also happen to my instructor and examiner colleagues. However, after comparing notes with hundreds of pilot friends, I can’t help but think that I may have had more than my fair share of abnormal and emergency situations while flying the friendly skies.
