We tend to think of a “gotcha” as a sneaky way of being tripped up. Something that a disgruntled examiner does to make life hard. This may occasionally be true, but most of the serious errors in aviation result from situations that fool us into poor responses. Nobody wants to crash. When it happens, it is almost always the result of a circumstance that has caught a pilot unaware. It could be weather or a mechanical issue. It could be due to a lack of proficiency on a particular approach or a misunderstanding in communication. Sometimes we simply get distracted and make a mistake. The truth is we already know most of the things that can get us into trouble. As it relates to pilot error, a century’s worth of human flight has already revealed pretty much every way that we can get it wrong.
Pay Attention to Your Velocity
Airspeed. There are a dozen different limitations associated with it: Vno, Vne, Va, Vs, flap speed, gear speed, approach speed, Vref. There is a reason for this alphabet soup of speed limits. It is the lifeblood of a fixed-wing aircraft. Nothing works without airspeed. Too much of it is better than too little, but not by much. Too slow and you lose control. Too fast and important components depart the airframe. Aviation begins and ends with speed. Not only do you need it to be safe, but it is also the primary reason why we fly (it is hard to justify the cost if you are not saving time).
Your airspeed should always be central to your instrument scan. During climb and approach, you should look at your airspeed indicator frequently (when changing power or configuration, you should scan it at least once every five seconds). Airspeed awareness is most important when communication requirements are at their highest. In the middle of this high workload environment, the margin for error is low (climb and approaches represent the lowest speeds we operate while aloft). There are a dozen different ways to get distracted while low and slow. Flub an ATC call, turn to a wrong heading or overshoot an altitude, and you will almost certainly survive (it is a very big sky). Lose track of your airspeed and the odds of survival rapidly diminish.
If you accumulate ice, the carefully considered aerodynamics of the engineers goes up in smoke. Airflow separation will occur at a lower angle of attack (AOA). Stall speed is higher. Drag and weight increase as well. Performance is degraded. Many manufacturers dictate a minimum speed for operation in icing conditions. Follow it like your life depends on it (it does). If you have any doubt fly faster. Remember that extra airspeed requires a longer rollout on landing (tailwind additives provide a quick means to assess how much extra runway will be required – carrying an extra knot of approach speed is the same as experiencing an extra knot of tailwind). Choose a longer runway if you need to, but keep your speed up. Going slowly off the end is better than a spin at low altitude.
The Trick with IMC
IMC accidents result in fatalities two-thirds of the time that they occur. This is a much higher rate of fatalities than is found in other types of accidents. In 2004, 6 percent of all accidents occurred in IMC. The relatively high rate of fatalities in those accidents produced an outsized 25 percent of all fatal accidents. These numbers have been fairly consistent over the decades. The NTSB published an in-depth study on the issue in 2005. This study piggybacked a technique that was formed during the investigation into the JFK Jr accident in 1999. The NTSB identified and interviewed other pilots who had operated in the same area at the same time as the accident flight. The hope was to identify the specific differences between those who successfully traversed areas of IMC versus those who perished.
The study captured data from 72 accident flights. This was contrasted against 135 non-accident flights (which had successfully operated in the same conditions at the same time). The FAA provided the results of practical and written tests associated with the accident pilots. The NTSB also reviewed incidents and enforcement actions connected with them. Comprehensive as it was, it was far from the first paper that had been published on the phenomena of IMC fatalities. Studies in 1968, 1974, 1976, and 1989 also sought to discover why pilots keep dying in the clouds. For their part, the NTSB issued 82 recommendations related to IMC operations between 1968 and 2004.
The study determined several trends associated with accident pilots. These pilots were older than average. While a majority of the accidents involved non-instrument-rated pilots, a striking number involved those with advanced ratings. VFR flight into IMC was the main cause of accidents for non-instrument-rated pilots. Continuing an approach below minimums was the bane for the IFR crowd. Plan continuation error (a phrase coined in the study) is defined as the “failure to revise a flight plan despite emerging evidence that it is no longer safe to continue.” In the face of deteriorating weather, continuing with the original plan can result in a potentially dangerous outcome. Yet this personality trait is ever-present in aviation. Unlike other errors that are inversely related to the number of flight hours a pilot possesses (i.e., fewer hours equals higher risk), continuation error tends to increase in proportion with flying experience. High-time pilots are some of the worst offenders.
At my previous employer, Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) data indicated, in one year, well over a thousand unstable approaches. The total number of these events was not really the issue (the data covered hundreds of thousands of flights), but rather the fact that only four go-arounds were accomplished out of the thousand-plus events. Our “professional” pilots proved to be highly resistant to modifying their original plan (executing a landing) when faced with emerging evidence that it was no longer safe to do so (an unstable condition). In aviation, the process is sometimes more important than the outcome. Safe on the ground following a go-around represents a success. Continuing a marginal approach is a failure – even if you manage to salvage a successful landing.
The Training Environment
Very few examiners get on the “gotcha” train because they enjoy writing pink slips. In most cases, the gotchas are introduced in order to see if the applicant’s knowledge can correlate to an out-of-the-box condition. When I was an examiner on the Embraer 170, training data indicated poor performance during recurrent check rides on non-precision approaches (localizers in particular). There were two possible reasons for this. The first was a lack of preparation by pilots prior to the check ride. The second was a lack of recency (LOC approaches – especially at big airports – typically occur only following a failure of the glideslope on an ILS, a relatively rare occurrence). There was debate within the training department as to the degree to which we should brief the LOC approach prior to an event. If our pilots were simply unprepared, we wanted them to experience discomfort during the check ride. If they couldn’t handle an approach they knew they were going to get in the simulator, how prepared would they be when they encountered it unexpectedly in the air? On the other hand, if they were simply rusty, we wanted to give them pointers to help them out. The localizer approach was already a “gotcha” for our crews. The question was, “How much training should occur during a checking event?” The answer is quite a bit more than you might think.
A successful check ride (particularly one that establishes a new rating) is not the end of learning. Rather, it is the beginning of the most dangerous phase of a pilot’s life: gaining experience in an increasingly complex environment without a safety net. The paper ticket the examiner gives you conveys the legal ability to operate. It does not mean that you have nothing left to work on or anything left to learn. It simply means that you have obtained the knowledge and skill necessary for a fair shot at surviving the never-ending series of learning experiences that aviation provides.
The training environment is a critical component of safe flight. Not only do the FAA and NTSB recognize this, but so do insurance companies. The statistics are simply too compelling to ignore. Recurrent training is a cure for pilot error much like sleep is a cure for fatigue. The failure to proactively apply the antidote increases the risk of a devastating error at an exponential rate. Sometimes sleep is not convenient. The same can be true of training. But both are major contributors to the safety record. And the proliferation of technology has made self-training easier than ever. It is remarkable how much proficiency you can gain with a PC and a flight simulator. You just need to set aside the time.
Most check rides begin with a knowledge validation. It is important to understand the high points of regulations and aircraft systems in order to safely function in the air. Here is a little secret to orals: Your examiner knows within the first five minutes whether you will pass. If you know your aircraft limitations by heart, understand the guiding principles of airspace and weather, and can figure out weight and balance without too much heartburn, you will be in good shape. Nobody expects perfection. You just need to be able to demonstrate that you have, at the very least, the basics covered.
It is nice to be able to describe the fuel system to the nth degree, but so long as you have the high points (how to check for contaminants, how much you need to carry), you will most likely survive both an oral and an average flight. Still, it is better to aim high than for the bare minimum. That said, unused knowledge erodes quickly, so memorizing an entire manual is a fool’s errand. If there is a knob or a switch that can be operated from the flight deck, it is good to know exactly what it does. Otherwise, being able to effectively reference the information in the Aircraft Manual is enough for the sake of safety.
Being prepared for an event will not only facilitate a less stressful check ride (not to mention the ignominy of a pink slip), but it will also make you a better pilot. And while nearly all pilots place a focus on reviewing regulatory and systems knowledge in anticipation of a training event, it is equally important to keep fresh during day-to-day life. A periodic review of aviation subjects produces greater clarity and confidence when operating an aircraft. Be sure to take the regulatory environment seriously. The FARs were written in blood. Do not add a chapter of your own. Remember the most damaging gotchas are often generated from fundamental mistakes.
Go fast, but not too fast. Stay out of the soup unless you are current and rated. Go around if you are unstable. Review any material that you are not current with. When things get swirlingly complex in the air, simplify. Watch your speed, maintain a stable attitude, and get vectors to a safe location where you can chew on alternatives. There are very few situations in an aircraft requiring a rapid decision. If you get confused, focus first on flying the aircraft. Once you are stable, take a breath and consider your options. Perfection is elusive. Operating safely is not.
