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  ground stop is a rare event reserved for extraordinary circumstances. The last time it happened was in 2001.
Initially, the idea circulated that the NOTAM failure was the result of a cyberattack, but the final cause was much more benign. An IT contractor had unintentionally deleted files while “working to correct synchronization between [primary] and backup databas- es.” Media experts soon postulated that antiquated IT systems had been the culprit. Some questioned the robust- ness of the NOTAM delivery mecha- nism. To be fair, the current system has decades of reliable operation under its belt. Still, the fiasco points to the obvious fact that a sole source failure was enough to paralyze domestic air travel – even if only for a handful of hours (most of which occurred in the middle of the night).
If you are into conspiracy theories, you might be inclined to think that the FAA did it on purpose. The 5-year budgetary process for the agency is up for reauthorization this year. Im- mediate talk by DOT representatives focused on the budget as a solution to the dilemma. The current NOTAM system is three decades old. Renewal is not slated to occur for another sev- eral years. On top of this, the current NOTAM system already has its detrac- tors. Designed primarily to inform pilots of non-published restrictions in the national aerospace system, it often serves as a dumping house of operationally marginal data. Three full pages of obstacle locations (listed via long-form coordinates) is the sort of information that almost no pilot can meaningfully use.
The current FAA budget contains a myriad of objectives. Integration of Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) into the national aerospace system is one.
Advocacy of U.S.-based companies is another. Flight safety is in there somewhere as well. Across the pond, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has targeted 2027 as an entry point for single-pilot air carrier operations (initially, it will be limited to long-distance cruise f lights, with two pilots still required in the terminal area). Boeing President Alexander Feldman commented on the issue in November. “The technol- ogy is there for single pilots; it’s re- ally about where the regulators and the general public feel comfortable.” Recently, Boeing CEO Dave Calhoun echoed the sentiment, stating, “The future of autonomy is real.” Airbus has long advocated for the removal of the second pilot. Tony Lucas, President of the Australian & International Pilots Association, counters, “The people go- ing down this route aren’t the people who fly jets every day. When things go awry [in an aircraft], they go awry fairly quickly.”
Technology vs. Humanity
The days of pilots having direct control over their aircraft are rapidly diminishing. Computer nannies have been introduced into nearly every ele- ment of flight. In most modern jets, basic control inputs are “modified” by
computers. It used to be that pilots pushed the stick, and that is where the aircraft went. It was reliable but not always safe (humans occasionally overreact). Limiting control surface def lection to maintain safe airframe loads (or to prevent stalls) has undoubt- edly saved lives, but it has also pro- duced an uncomfortable byproduct. In a f ly-by-wire aircraft, pilots now issue maneuvering “requests” instead of commands. Automation has the fi- nal say over an increasing number of processes. This has produced a pretty good safety record, but it is not with- out danger. Look to Boeing’s own 737 MAX as an example.
Technology has proven to be highly effective in reducing the accident rate in aviation, but up until now, it has always been in conjunction with a hu- man operator. In the 1950s and 60s (the dawn of jet travel), there were half-a-dozen fatal crashes every year. Now they are exceedingly uncommon. And when they do occur, they rarely result in mass casualties (the last in the U.S. was the crash of Colgan Air 3407 in 2009). The proliferation of reliable turbine engines and a better understanding of adverse weather is a large part of the massive improvement in air safety over the past 60 years. Technological innovation has done the rest, yielding a 95 percent increase in airline safety since 1998.
General aviation is a slightly differ- ent story. Though the accident rate has decreased, it has not been as quick. There are a few obvious reasons for this. The first is that GA is comprised of a considerable proportion of piston aircraft. The reliability of piston pow- erplants has not changed much over the past half-century. The second is
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